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Evidence-Based Reform of the
Unemployment Insurance System
Stephen A. Wandner
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The UI system has not
responded to the dramatic
changes in the economy.
n UI benefits must be
adequate to see workers
through periods of
displacement without forcing
them to take a job that does
not match their skills.
n The most important single
change to bring UI benefits
and taxes into balance would
be to increase the UI taxable
wage base and index it to the
Social Security wage base.
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The U.S. Unemployment Insurance (UI) system
has served jobless workers for nearly 80 years. Even
though the U.S. economy, and more specifically
its labor force, has changed dramatically during
this time, the UI system has changed little.
There is broad consensus that the UI system has
not responded to the dramatic changes in the
economy. The service-producing sectors of the
economy have far outpaced the goods-producing
sectors, an increasing share of workers are in parttime, contingent jobs, and many states have not
replenished the reserves needed to pay benefits
that were depleted during the last recession and
are ill-prepared for another economic downturn.
All these structural changes call for UI reform but
none has been implemented. Rather, the UI system
is woefully out of balance and even more so since
the Great Recession. States have reduced their
duration and level of benefits while not increasing
the tax base to finance the needed cash assistance
provided by UI benefits.
This article describes the recommendations of
several experts on the UI system that are compiled
and synthesized in a book recently edited by Dr.
Stephen Wandner and published by the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
Unemployment Insurance Reform: Fixing a Broken
System (see p. 7 for more information). The main
thrust of this book is the need for comprehensive
reform that creates a robust, self-sustaining UI
program that restores the ability of the system
to reliably provide temporary, adequate income
replacement during unemployed workers’ search
for reemployment. UI reforms should balance
benefits and taxes, both in the long term and over a
business cycle. UI benefits must be adequate to see
workers through periods of displacement without
forcing them to take a job that does not match their
skills or discouraging them from actively searching
for reemployment. In addition, UI taxes need to
pay for a robust program of UI benefits, and the

tax burden should be distributed equitably. Finally,
the book argues that UI benefits should extend
to all workers who are temporarily unemployed,
including part-time and other contingent workers.
KEY REFORMS
The contributors to the book offer considerable
detail regarding various aspects of the UI system
that they firmly believe need reform. This article
highlights their comprehensive suggestions for
stabilizing the system into the future and for better
serving the workers it was established to benefit.
1. Bring benefits and taxes into balance
The UI system today is out of balance. The
federal tax base is inadequate, as are many state
taxable wage bases. Tax rates are not necessarily
adjusted to accommodate adequate benefit
payment levels, and benefit levels and maximums
are adjusted upward over time in some states but
not others. Strategic balancing of UI revenues
and benefits has been neglected throughout the
program’s history at both the state and federal
levels. By contrast, Congress has assured that Social
Security’s benefit levels and taxable wage base keep
up with the cost of living. The same should be
done with UI. The most important single change to
bring UI benefits and taxes into balance would be
to increase the UI taxable wage base and index it
to the Social Security wage base (see Figure 1 and
item 7 below).
2. Regular UI benefits
The basic 26-week UI system must be revised.
UI should provide adequate benefit levels
and durations as well as reasonable eligibility
conditions for workers with past attachment to
the labor force before they become unemployed.
And the benefit provisions should adapt to the
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substantial changes to the workforce
that have occurred in the United States
in recent decades.
3. Adequate benefit levels
Given the states’ wide discretion
to shape their state UI programs, UI
benefit provisions vary greatly across
the country, and they are likely to
continue to do so in the future. This
variation is significant enough that it
creates substantial equity problems,
with unemployed workers receiving
widely different duration levels, even
after adjusting for state differences
in average weekly wages. Because of
dramatic differences in the adequacy of
state benefit provisions, there have been
proponents of federal benefit standards
for seven decades. They have concluded
tha the original proposal from the
1940s is the most reasonable—to set
the maximum weekly benefit amount at
two-thirds of each state’s average weekly
wage.

4. Adequate benefit duration
There should be a minimum of 26
weeks of potential duration. From the
mid-1970s until 2010, all states had
a maximum potential duration of at
least 26 weeks, but the spread of lower
maximum potential durations over the
past few years shows that enacting such
a standard is necessary.
5. Eligibility conditions
A few states have significantly
narrowed benefit eligibility and
harshened benefit administration. States
should be encouraged to avoid punitive
eligibility conditions that reduce benefit
recipiency below reasonable levels. On
the other hand, as a social insurance
program, unemployed workers should
not be eligible for UI benefits unless
they have exhibited recent attachment
to the labor force. To achieve this
goal, O’Leary and Wandner (Chapter
5) recommend setting eligibility for
minimum benefit amounts with high

Figure 1 UI and Social Security Taxable Wage Bases and the Ratio of Total to UI Taxable Wages,
1937–2017
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6. Adjust other benefit provisions to
the changing labor force
The biggest changes to the workforce
over the past two decades have
been more multiple earners within
households, a long-term increase
in the participation of women, and
the increased participation of older
workers. The UI program could
adjust to this modern labor force by
implementing the following changes:
• For two-worker families, UI should
pay benefits when one spouse
follows the other to a new job in a
new location.
• The participation of women and
older workers has resulted in a sharp
increase in part-time work. The UI
program should allow unemployed
workers to collect UI if they choose
to search for part-time work.
• Older workers often must change
career jobs or move to jobs that
bridge their transition to full
retirement. These transitions require
job search methods that are different
from traditional job searches for
similar employment. The transitions
also often result in older workers
taking bridge jobs that involve
a decline in wages, a change in
industry and occupation, or a change
from full-time to part-time work, so
older workers should receive special
reemployment services to help with
the search for bridge jobs and new
careers.
• Because many older workers are
continuing to work after leaving
their long-term career jobs, the
federal pension offset provision
should be eliminated.
7. Adequate, equitable funding

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data: Employment and Training
Handbook No. 394, http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp (accessed October 23, 2018); annual taxable
wage base for Social Security from the Social Security Association and Internal Revenue Service.
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Today, low-wage employers pay
a disproportionate share of UI taxes.
They may pay UI taxes on all or nearly
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all of their wages paid, while high-wage
employers may pay taxes on only a
small portion of their wage bill.
• A higher taxable wage base is needed
to spread the burden among lowand high-wage employers, as well as
to raise adequate revenue to support
the UI system.
• The UI taxable wage base must
increase considerably, such that it
equals between one-third and onehalf of the Social Security taxable
wage base. It should also be indexed
each year to increase at the same
percentage rate as the Social Security
taxable wage base. Alternatively,
the UI taxable wage base could be
tied to the average wage in covered
UI employment rather than to the
Social Security wage base.
• To have a sound UI tax system, state
tax schedules should be set such
that no state is permitted to include
a zero rate in any tax schedule so
that all employers support the UI
system’s operating costs and each
tax schedule includes at least 10
rates so that all employers pay
UI taxes closely reflecting their
unemployment experience.
• Employers tend to oppose increases
in UI benefits and taxes because
they pay the entire tax. UI research,
however, indicates that the incidence
of the UI tax falls, in large part, on
workers through reductions in their
total compensation—that is, wages
plus benefits. The UI tax should
change from an employer tax to a
joint employer-employee tax, with
employees paying half or more of the
tax so that employees have increased
ownership in the UI program.
8. Countercyclical funding
During economic downturns, the UI
system has greater demand for benefits
and receives less revenue than it does
during periods of expansion. To have
a countercyclical financing system,
forward funding is needed.
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• The UI Trust Fund should have
adequate reserves before a recession
begins. UI taxes should not increase
at the beginning of a recession.
Rather, state accounts in the UI
Trust Fund should be restored after a
recession is over and before the next
recession begins.
• States should adhere to the
appropriate tax schedule under their
state law, without any legislative
deferral of movement to higher
schedules, subject to the loss of UI
offset credits. State tax schedules
should be selected annually based on
maintaining or achieving adequate
state system reserves.
• U.S. Department of Labor reserve
requirements should guide states
in attaining reserve adequacy.
Building an adequate trust fund can
be facilitated by either requiring
states to reach an adequate level of
reserves or by providing states with a
financial incentive for building their
reserves to a specified level. Both
approaches have been recommended
by UI reform proposals, and both
would improve system solvency.
9. Administrative financing
The administration of the UI,
Employment Service (ES), and
other federal-state labor market
programs is funded from the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act portion of
the UI tax. Federal funding pays for
program administration, extended
benefits, and loans to states—each
with its own account. States have
faced severe funding problems in the
administration of these programs
for many years, and it has become
even worse over time. The balances
in the federal accounts have been
inadequate, and Congress has
appropriated a declining percentage
of the tax revenues that are deposited
into the administrative account.
Congress should fully fund UI and ES
administration. Appropriation levels for
UI should fully reflect benefit payment,

benefit integrity, and tax collection
costs. The levels for ES should be greatly
increased, bringing appropriations back
to the 1984 level in real terms—a time
when ES funding was more adequate.
10. Extended benefits
Although Congress will always
want to have the final say about benefit
duration extensions during recessions,
it often is slow to act. The United States
needs an automatic system of benefit
extensions that works in a timely fashion.
• Extended benefits (EB) are not
insurable and consequently cannot
be financed as if they were. Rather,
they should not be treated like the
regular 26-week program but should
be funded from general federal
revenues, either from the UI Trust
Fund or from general revenue.
• Existing EB triggers should be
replaced with a new trigger
mechanism that uses the total
unemployment rate rather than the
insured unemployment rate. More
specifically, recent EB program
proposals reviewed in the book
call for improving the EB trigger
mechanism by making use of the
total unemployment rate and having
multiple levels of EB durations from 7
to 54 weeks. In addition, the number
of weeks of EB should vary with the
unemployment rate, so that EB is
sensitive to the severity of recessions.
11. The work test and reemployment
services
The work test is crucial for having
the UI program remain as a social
insurance program. ES and UI
programs provide the work test under
federal law, ensuring that UI recipients
are able, available, and actively
searching for work. Reemployment
services also refer UI recipients to jobs
and provides them with labor market
information. These services are critical
in a world with few temporary layoffs
and many permanently displaced
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unemployed workers. Job search
assistance and other reemployment
services programs have been shown to
be highly cost-effective in promoting
return to work and in shortening
durations of UI benefit receipt.
• The UI and ES programs need
sufficient funding to provide
displaced workers with intensive,
in-person job search assistance.
• Funding of reemployment
services—under both the WagnerPeyser Act and the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act—
should be increased, with WagnerPeyser Act funding restored to its
1984 level in real terms.
• Other reemployment and
unemployment prevention services
can speed the return to work of UI
recipients by expanding the use of
short-time compensation and selfemployment assistance programs,
and by enacting a program of
targeted reemployment bonuses.
CONCLUSION
Public policy regarding the UI
program has been neglected for many
decades. Much of the program is
broken and requires major reform
now. Both states and the federal
government should adopt policies and
enact legislation that can restore the
program, consistent with its original
intent. Otherwise, the system will be
inadequate in the future, particularly
when it is needed during the next
recession. The changing nature of the
workforce requires that the UI system
provide adequate benefits to every
worker while remaining financially
solvent to ensure a competitive
economy and a well-functioning
workforce.
Stephen A. Wandner is a Research Fellow at the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
a Non-Resident Fellow at the Urban Institute, and
a Senior Fellow at the National Academy of Social
Insurance.
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Why Do Wages Differ
across Businesses within
the Same Labor Market?
Eliza C. Forsythe
The idea that wages can differ across
businesses in the same market seems
contrary to basic economic theory.
Yet, we find that wages do differ across
establishments. Looking at the service
sector—which has grown steadily for
decades in numbers and as a share of
total U.S. employment but pays less
than most other major sectors—I
find great variation in wages paid to
workers at the lowest end of the pay
scale. More specifically, the bottom 10
percent of establishments pay wages
below $8.07 per hour to employees
in their lowest decile of wages, while
the top 10 percent of establishments
pay wages above $21.14 to employees
in their lowest decile. I also find that
establishments that pay low wages
to those workers in the lowest decile
of the wage distribution within an
establishment also pay low wages
throughout the pay scale.
The heterogeneity of wages across
establishments is important not
only to explain why wages differ in
single labor markets but also to help
understand the implications of various
public policies such as minimum wage
legislation. For example, minimum
wage legislation that requires wages
to be above $10 an hour will have no

effect on establishments that pay their
lowest paid workers $21 an hour, while
it could have significant effects on
establishments that pay their lowest
paid workers only $8 an hour. I find
that even in the service sector, in which
a substantial fraction of employees is
paid close to statutory minimum wage,
there is substantial variation in wages
across establishments in which some
are not impinged by such a wage floor.
Previous research on wage
heterogeneity between firms has found
that wages vary by firm size, with
larger firms paying more than smaller
firms, even within the same industry.
Several studies have also found that
establishments within the same
industry adopt different management
and production technologies, which can
lead to differences in productivity with
the understanding that more productive
firms can pay higher wages. I contribute
to this literature by examining the wage
and occupational structure for service
sector establishments in the United
States in 2016.
Methodology
This article describes results from
my recent study and working paper,
“The Occupational Structures of

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Establishments within narrowly defined industries and within the same local labor
market pay different wages.
n These establishments differ significantly in their occupational structure, which
indicates that apparently similar establishments can differ substantially by production
process yet still compete in the same market.
n The variation in wages and occupational structures suggests that public policies
such as minimum wage may affect workers differently, even within the same industry
and labor market.

